

## THE 'CYPRUS QUESTION' AND BRITAIN'S DECISION TO LEAVE TURKEY AND GREECE OUTSIDE NATO DURING ITS FORMATION YEARS, 1948 – 1949

Norasmahani Hussain

History Section of School of Humanities

Universiti Sains Malaysia

*norasmahani@usm.my*

### ABSTRACT

*The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an intergovernmental military alliance of unusual geographical membership that was signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington D.C. Twelve countries famously became founding members, but Turkey and Greece were surprisingly not included. In point of fact, these two Mediterranean countries were arguably victims that suffered from the 'aggression' of the Soviet Union in the early post-Second World War years and had some strong reasons for being included in NATO. The literature usually focuses on the geographical area of Turkey and Greece and a Mediterranean Pact in explaining why Britain refused to invite these countries to join NATO during its formation years. However, when placing more attention to the perspective of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and his Foreign Office regarding this rejection issue, the 'Cyprus question', which refers to a major dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, also influenced them in tightening Britain's decision to leave Turkey and Greece outside NATO. British documentary analysis illuminates the degree of influence of the problem of Cyprus on British considerations of western security. In particular, this paper offers analysis of British Foreign Office objections to the admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO before NATO was successfully established. Previous researchers have largely drawn attention to Britain's general views on the structure and membership of NATO, and on Britain as a major instigator of the alliance. This paper, however, will discuss the 'objection issue' towards Turkey and Greece from the point of view of Britain, particularly from the perspective of the 'Cyprus question'.*

**Keywords:** NATO's formation years, Turkish and Greek membership of NATO, Cyprus.

### 1. Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an intergovernmental military alliance which was formed on 4 April 1949 in Washington D.C. The original twelve countries were the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy. The Treaty requires these countries to give a commitment to maintain the security of the North Atlantic area from outsider's aggression.<sup>i</sup> As NATO was formed in the early period of the Cold War, it was clear that the Treaty referred to the Soviet Union as the outside aggression. The ultimate aim of NATO was to fight the Soviet Union and communism. This underlying premise behind the creation of NATO has been embraced by traditionalist historians. The traditionalists argue 'the onset of the Cold War was simply due to the failure of the Soviet Union to adhere to wartime agreements and its determination after 1945 to expand communism as far as possible.'<sup>ii</sup> This apparently defiant attitude of the Soviet Union led the United States to react by developing a policy of deterrence which produced NATO. Besides traditionalists, there are three more prominent schools of thought that also discuss the origins of the Cold War and NATO: the revisionist,<sup>iii</sup> the post-revisionists,<sup>iv</sup> and the British school of thought.<sup>v</sup> Although these schools of thought have their own perspectives on

who caused the Cold War, it would be accurate to conclude that these schools of thoughts unanimously viewed the genesis of NATO from the context of the Cold War.

It is worth mentioning here that there are two distinctive groups that differentiate their type of membership in NATO. The first is the founding countries which consist of seven countries that initially formulated the Treaty of NATO: the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The second is a group of invited countries that were eligible to join based on two deliberations. The first is countries that had been threatened and had the potential to be threatened by the Soviet Union: Norway, Denmark and Italy; and the second is countries that would be an asset for NATO: Portugal and Iceland.<sup>vi</sup> In light of NATO membership consideration for Scandinavian countries and Italy, it is arguable that Greece and Turkey should have also been invited to join NATO. These two Mediterranean countries were arguably 'victims' that suffered from the Soviet Union's aggression in the early period of the Cold War, the same 'enemy' faced by members of NATO.

In Greece, the Greek Royalist government had fought against Greek Communists in the Greek Civil War. The Greek Communist insurgents were given support by the neighbouring countries of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.<sup>vii</sup> Although there was no overt interference by the Soviet Union in the Greek Civil War, the Western bloc, especially Britain and the United States, were politically conscious of the policy of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, which was 'to ensure that the countries which bordered the Soviet Union did not have anti-Soviet governments.'<sup>viii</sup> Thus, Britain and the United States 'believed Moscow would welcome a communist-controlled Greece if, as seemed likely, the Royalist government collapsed.'<sup>ix</sup> In Turkey, the Soviet Union placed constant diplomatic pressure on the Turkish government to agree with its demands on the provinces of Kars and Ardahan in northern Turkey. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was putting an enormous strain on the settlement of the Black Sea Straits by asking Turkey to allow the Soviet navy to have a base and authorisation in using the Straits.<sup>x</sup> However, it was surprising that the founding countries, especially Britain, resolutely refused to invite Greece and Turkey to become members of NATO based on two significant facts. The first is: Greece and Turkey were meaningful countries for Britain because of the importance of the Middle East to British national interests. The second is: political crisis in these two countries was as much the keystone of the development of the Cold War tension and the existence of NATO.

When focusing on the onset of the Cold War and subsequently NATO from the view of the British school, it is arguable that the political crisis in Greece and Turkey was also the reason for the former to happen and the latter to be created. It should be noted that the key issue in both circumstances is the involvement of the United States. It is worth reminding here that in the aftermath of Second World War, the United States seemed to be retreating into its old isolationism.<sup>xi</sup> It was Britain whom persuaded the United States to keep intervening in international affairs by convincing it that those crises in Greece and Turkey were happened due to Soviet Union's ambition in expanding its political and ideological influence over those countries. Britain called on the United States to play a more effective role in bringing peace to Greece and Turkey due to the Cabinet decision to cut military expenditure to these countries because of Britain's economic difficulty in the post-Second World War period. Britain worried the decision to withdraw from Greece and Turkey would jeopardise the future of these countries, thus the United States assistance in preventing these countries from being converted into one of Soviet Union's satellite countries was crucial.<sup>xii</sup> If Greece and Turkey fell under the domination of the Soviet Union, the Middle East would also be under threat of being conquered by the Soviet Union. This was the most likely event that Britain wanted to avoid from happening. The Middle East region was valuable to Britain because of its enormous oil

reserves and the availability of bases for military facilities. The rise of Soviet Union influence and the augmentation of power projection capabilities in Greece and Turkey, could seriously threaten British lines of communication and oil supplies (the Middle East), and ultimately jeopardise the strategic bombing offensive against the Soviet Union in case of war.<sup>xiii</sup> Therefore, the Soviet Union's attitude towards Greece and Turkey was seen as a threat to the position of Britain in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.<sup>xiv</sup>

Britain quest for United States help was fruitful when its President, Harry S. Truman, agreed that Greece and Turkey undisputedly needed help and decided to provide \$400 million in aid to these countries. Cameron states that: 'for the first time in its history, the US had chosen to intervene in peacetime outside the Americas.'<sup>xv</sup> The aid delivered under the Truman Doctrine was announced on 12 March 1947. Truman promised that the aid would assist 'free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.'<sup>xvi</sup> Although Truman did not directly mention 'the Soviet Union' or 'communism' in his speech, it could not be denied that the real aim was to help Greece and Turkey to resist Soviet expansionism.<sup>xvii</sup> Quite evidently, although Britain was struggling with a serious drain on its finances, Britain was still concerned with the safety of Greece and Turkey and asked the United States help in preventing these countries from being penetrated by the Soviet Union. This was obviously because the importance of these countries and the Middle East to British national interests.

Despite the future of Greece and Turkey would become more promising, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had visibly deteriorated. The tension between the two countries was likely to be known as the Cold War. A war of nerves became more apparent when the United States decided to expand its economic aid towards the other democratic nations in Europe which confronting an internal or external menace from communist forces.<sup>xviii</sup> From Truman Doctrine to the Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program – ERP), both United States initiatives had agitated the Soviet Union; and as a result, the Soviet Union responded aggressively by sabotaging the ERP. In counter-response to the Soviet Union's disgraceful behaviour towards the ERP, Britain reckoned the Soviet Union's threat must be contained through the military field too; thus, the founding countries made an arrangement for the formation of a new military alliance of NATO. Evidently, political crisis in Greece and Soviet threat to Turkey were the catalyst of the Cold War conflict, and led naturally into the creation of NATO. Given the fact that Britain could no longer guard the safety of Greece and Turkey alone, NATO could be a necessary mechanism in securing the defence of these two countries. Surprisingly, during negotiations years in forming NATO, 1948 to early 1949, neither Britain nor the United States suggested for Greece or Turkey to be invited to join NATO although these two Mediterranean countries showed their enthusiasm in participating in NATO.<sup>xix</sup>

## 2. The geographical area issue and a Mediterranean Pact

When explaining the reasons why these two Mediterranean countries were omitted by the original seven founding countries during the formation years of NATO, the literature usually focuses on the geographical area of Turkey and Greece. These seven crucial founding countries argued that Turkey and Greece were located in a Mediterranean region; thus, they unanimously agreed to exclude Turkey and Greece because both were considered as being “neither in Western Europe nor in the Atlantic”.<sup>xx</sup> Apart from the geographical issues, Britain, one of these founding countries, preferred to include Turkey and Greece in a Mediterranean Pact, a new security system of the Mediterranean, rather than the North Atlantic.

As a matter of fact, a Mediterranean Pact was initially proposed by Turkey in early March 1947. However, there was no response from Britain, or specifically Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office, to this proposal and no further discussion had taken place on this matter.<sup>xxi</sup> Surprisingly, the plan for a Mediterranean Pact was revived by Bevin when Turkey and Greece acknowledged their interests to be one of the invited countries to join NATO. Bevin made a promise to Turkey that he would ensure the arrangement for a Mediterranean Pact as soon as NATO was successfully formed and, most importantly, when the time was opportune.<sup>xxii</sup> By doing that, Bevin held out hope that Turkey would change its mind about joining NATO and would instead give full attention to joining a Mediterranean Pact.

## 3. Italian membership of NATO

It should be remembered that Italy was one of amongst twelve countries which signed the treaty of NATO on 4 April 1949 although it was also a Mediterranean country. As a matter of fact, Italy was also been considered by Britain to be included in a Mediterranean Pact together with Greece, Turkey and Iran.<sup>xxiii</sup> Strangely, Italy had been invited to join NATO. Therefore, the arguments over the geographical issue and the Mediterranean Pact that happened to exclude Greece and Turkey from NATO could be challenged with the example of Italy. The Italian membership of NATO was quite a tricky issue and it is an interesting point to be discussed. At first, only the United States delegates to the Pentagon Talks and the Washington Talks (these two Talks held the negotiations to form NATO) was in favour of Italian membership while the British and the Canadians delegates were opposed to it. British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, for instance, strongly resisted Italian membership based on the argument that it was a Mediterranean country which cannot be grouped within the Atlantic system, and he preferred to include Italy in a Mediterranean Pact.<sup>xxiv</sup> The United States or particularly John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs in the State Department, however, strongly supported Italian membership because the Italians elections would be held within three weeks, and Hickerson was worried that the Communist Party in Italy would overwhelm the elections.<sup>xxv</sup> Hickerson’s decision over Italian membership was made based on the first consideration – countries that had been threatened and had the potential to be threatened by the Soviet Union would be considered to be invited to join NATO. Although Italy was a Mediterranean country, Italy managed to secure its place in NATO because there was a risk that Italy would turn into a communist country if the Communist Party won the elections in Italy. In those circumstances, it would be possible to say that Greece and Turkey would probably have the same chance to join NATO because these two countries had already experienced the Soviet Union’s aggression. Nonetheless, none of these three delegations suggested Greece and Turkey as possible members of NATO. The case of Italy showed that the United States, or specifically Hickerson, had made a considerable effort for the sake of Italy by considering Italy as a member of NATO. Given that Greece and Turkey were greatly important to British strategic interests; thus, it is disturbing that Bevin did not do the same thing for Greece and Turkey similar to what Hickerson did with Italy.

It is worth mentioning here that even Bevin did not take part in the negotiations. In fact, Bevin supervised the negotiations through the British delegations. Every single views, suggestions, decisions and oppositions that were put forward by the British delegations in the negotiations were actually directed by Bevin. It seemed that the British delegations were controlled by a puppet master, and it was Bevin who was 'pulling the string'. Thus, any actions and decisions from the British delegations that represented Great Britain in the series of negotiations could be defined as Bevin's decisions.<sup>xxvi</sup> In that case, apparently, Bevin was the person who was responsible for the exclusion of Greece and Turkey from NATO during NATO's formation years. However, the United States had changed its mind over Italian membership. This new decision was made by George C. Marshall (Secretary of State), Robert A. Lovett (Undersecretary of State), Senator John Foster Dulles and Senator Vandenberg when they met two days after the Italian general election. Because the Communists were soundly defeated in the Italian general election, they all felt that the inclusion of Italy in NATO would be a mistake since it would destroy the natural geographic basis of the North Atlantic area.<sup>xxvii</sup> The exclusion of Italy from NATO indicated that there was no hope for Greece and Turkey to be considered as possible members of NATO. At that time, it was almost absolutely certain that Greece, Turkey and Italy would cooperate together under a Mediterranean Pact. Nevertheless, the decision to exclude Italy from NATO was not absolutely final because it was well-known that Italy was included as NATO member when the treaty was signed in April 1949.

It was France who demanded Italian membership in NATO, and it threatened to withdraw its participation from NATO if its proposal to include Italy and as well as French North Africa (Algeria) into NATO were rejected.<sup>xxviii</sup> Besides, the French also warned it would only accept Norway as a member of NATO if Italy was also accepted into NATO.<sup>xxix</sup> Although the United States regarded the French attitudes as blackmail in order to fulfil its self-satisfaction, eventually the United States agreed to invite Italy into NATO, and French North Africa (Algeria) was included within the coverage area of NATO.<sup>xxx</sup> Since Italy managed to obtain its place in NATO, it seems to be the case that the United States could compromise any proposal over membership even it was a bit ridiculous, for instance the French demands on French North African (Algerian) and Italian membership in NATO. In that case, it would be true to say that if Britain really wanted Greece and Turkey to be included in NATO during the negotiations, surely it would have fought for Greeks and Turkish membership like France did with Italy.

Ironically, Britain, while consistently disregarding the membership of Turkey and Greece in NATO, it never understated the importance of these countries to British national interests. This was clearly shown when Britain guaranteed Turkey and Greece that the negotiations for an Atlantic Pact did not imply any lessening of British interest in Turkish and Greek security.<sup>xxxi</sup> Therefore, it raises the question of why Britain denied its political support to Turkey and Greece regarding their acceptance into NATO. Thus, this paper will fill the gap that surrounds the question of why Britain had little interest in pressing for Greek and Turkish membership of NATO despite British strategic interests in both countries. When placing more attention on the perspective of Bevin and the Foreign Office regarding the reasons why Turkey and Greece were excluded as eligible countries to be invited to join NATO during its formation years, there are several related cases that must not be neglected in order to understand their decision. Firstly, the keenness of Bevin to have NATO swiftly formed.<sup>xxxii</sup> Secondly, the United States kept delaying the ratification of the treaty of NATO due to some disagreement with the membership proposals. Thirdly, the United States firmly stressed that no invitations would be given to countries struggling with domestic political difficulties. Fourthly, Turkey and Greece were in bitter dispute because of Cyprus. The fourth reason could probably been considered by historians as irrelevant or remote from the literature regarding the rejection of Turkey and Greece from NATO. Thus, explains the reasons why historians made less effort in investigating

the correlation between the 'Cyprus question' and Bevin's rejection reasons. However, the fourth argument became logical when three others cases have been taken into account. It is arguable that Bevin did not press for Turkish and Greek membership of NATO despite British strategic interests in both countries because of the delay they might have brought to its formation.

### **5. The 'Cyprus question': the 'dispute' between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus during NATO's negotiations years, 1948 – 1949.**

Available literature usually focuses on the frame time between 1955 until 1959 when discussing the Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey.<sup>xxxiii</sup> The Cyprus 'dispute' that will be the focus of this paper was the Cyprus ethnic dispute which referred to the bitter argument between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus between 1948 and 1949; and how this matter also influenced Britain, or more specifically Bevin, on his decision to refuse the entry of Turkey and Greece into NATO. It is worth noting here that when Greece and Turkey quarrelled over Cyprus, this island was still under British rule. Cyprus had once been declared a Crown Colony by Britain in 1925. Initially the Cyprus dispute was a conflict between the people of Cyprus over the demand for self-determination. However, the disagreement eventually shifted from a colonial dispute to an ethnic dispute between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. These two ethnic groups became rivals because they had different ideas for the future settlement of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots demanded that Cyprus be united with Greece, famously referred to as *enosis*, but the Turkish Cypriots strongly opposed *enosis* and preferred Cyprus to annex with Turkey instead. However, because of the small number of Turkish Cypriots compared to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots changed their aim from annexation to a partition of the island, also known as *taksim*. Since then, the Cyprus dispute has been well-known for its opposing ideas of nationalism between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This Cyprus ethnic dispute became more complicated when both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots dragged their mother countries, Greece and Turkey, into their conflict.<sup>xxxiv</sup> Initially, an effort by Greek Cypriots to bring Greece into the question in Cyprus commenced ever since *enosis* started, but only after 1945 was Greece definitely involved in this matter due to its renewal interest in Cyprus.<sup>xxxv</sup> Turkey, meanwhile, had intervened in the Cyprus 'dispute' later than Greece, which was in November 1948 due to massive pressure from the press and the public in Turkey.<sup>xxxvi</sup> By the time Turkey decided to help Turkish Cypriots in preventing *enosis*, the Presidential election of 1948 in the United States had just ended, and the United States was just in the position to resume the negotiations on forming NATO that had been postponed earlier.

As a consequence of Greece and Turkey's intervention in the 'Cyprus question', Cyprus was quickly becoming a contentious matter between these countries. The growing tension between Greece and Turkey because of *enosis* had given the United States a perception that it had made a correct decision by deciding that Greece and Turkey were ineligible to be invited as members of NATO since the initial stage of negotiations to form NATO, although at that time these two countries were excluded because of geographical issues and a Mediterranean Pact. In a report by Sir Oliver Franks, the British ambassador to the United States, he informed Bevin that during the discussions about NATO's membership, the United States persistently showed unfavourable responses to the countries which struggled with serious domestic problems for instance Spain, Italy and French North Africa (Algeria).<sup>xxxvii</sup> The United States government considered these countries would likely be a liability to NATO instead of an asset.

## 6. The 'Cyprus question' and its influence on Bevin's rejection decision over Greek and Turkish membership of NATO

The relationship between Greece and Turkey was affected by this Cyprus ethnic dispute, and it was far from being settled. It should be noted that by the early year of 1949, the United States was bothered by the issue of the Italian and the French North African (Algerian) NATO membership. Clearly, the United States had enough on its plate. Given that the United States strongly protested against the countries that were struggling with their severe domestic political difficulties from being invited to join NATO; and the United States even had postponed the signing ceremony of the treaty of NATO because of Italian and French North African (Algerian) membership issue; hence, Bevin expected the same delay would happen again if Britain supported the disputed countries of Turkey and Greece in becoming NATO members. This was a circumstance that Bevin wanted to avoid from happening. The reason why the United States opposed the problematic countries from being invited to join NATO was because it worried that they would become a liability rather than an asset to NATO.<sup>xxxviii</sup> In addition, during the negotiations in the Washington Talks, except the French delegates, the other delegates in the Committee of the Ambassadors unanimously resisted the inclusion of French North Africa (Algeria) 'on the ground that it set a precedent for other colonial areas and posed the risk of drawing them into colonial conflicts.'<sup>xxxix</sup> These delegates of the Washington Talks were worried that if French North Africa (Algeria) were to be included in NATO, this would give a chance for any other delegates that also possessed colonial areas to claim the place for its colonies in NATO. Although these delegates did not specifically mention which other colonial areas that were meant by them in the meetings, they were surely referring to Britain and its Crown Colony of Cyprus that was currently in a bitter dispute between Greece and Turkey.

During that time, Cyprus was still under British Colonial Empire, and they were worried that Britain might try to imitate what France did with French North Africa (Algeria). These delegates of the Washington Talks were worried that their respective nations would get involved in the Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey if Cyprus was accepted as a member of NATO – just like Britain, which was inevitably entangled in that dispute because of its status as the sovereign power in Cyprus. Based on the negative responses of these delegates on the possibility of their respective nations to be involved in the 'Cyprus question', it is arguable that if Bevin suggested Greek and Turkish NATO membership, the delegates at the Washington Talks would massively oppose this proposal. As many problems already existed throughout the negotiations of forming NATO, Bevin really did not want to give more reasons for the United States to delay the signatory of the treaty of NATO. It is worth noting here that, at first, the United States expected to conclude the negotiations in February 1949, and the signing ceremony of the treaty of NATO was to be held in the same month. Unfortunately, the negotiations had to be carried out to settle the problems regarding membership matter.<sup>xl</sup> Seemingly, Italian membership prolonged the negotiations and also caused continuous debates amongst the seven original members.

Hence, the decision to exclude Turkey and Greece was seen by Bevin as a practical way of avoiding more delays in concluding NATO's treaty. This Bevin's decision is reflected in a record of a meeting of the Meeting of Consultative Council of the Five-Power Brussels Treaty, London 27th–29th January 1949. This meeting record is placed in FO 800 which is the files that hold all Bevin's private papers during his time as Foreign Secretary. Bevin said that Greece and Turkey might present some difficulties, and he, therefore, was reluctant to include Greece and Turkey into NATO at that time.<sup>xli</sup> Although Bevin did not explain what 'some difficulties' meant clearly, based on the current difficult situation between Greece and Turkey because of Cyprus, it seemed that the 'Cyprus question' was one of 'some difficulties' that was meant by Bevin. The United States believed Greece and Turkey could contribute less to NATO because of the dispute between them over Cyprus.<sup>xlii</sup> With the

exemption of Italian membership, the United States strongly opposed to more Mediterranean countries to be included into NATO.<sup>xliii</sup> Therefore, this matter could definitely become another excuse for the United States to drag the negotiations longer. If the United States kept postponing effort towards NATO establishment, Bevin's objective to see the new Atlantic security system to be formed as soon as possible would definitely be difficult to achieve.

## 6. Conclusion

The literature normally referred to the geographical area of Greece and Turkey and a Mediterranean Pact as reasons that influenced Bevin to exclude Greece and Turkey from being NATO members during its negotiations years. However, by analysing the situation from Britain's perspective regarding its concerns over possible delays, the 'Cyprus question' which was a major 'discord' between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus also influenced Bevin in remaining firm on its decision to leave Turkey and Greece out of NATO. The Cyprus 'dispute' between Greece and Turkey inflicted damage on these countries' chances to become NATO's members.

Based on the United States' opinion over Greek and Turkish membership, Bevin believed the United States would have continued the negotiations until Britain, or specifically Bevin, dropped the idea to bring Greece and Turkey into NATO. This was due to two circumstances: first, since the beginning of the negotiations, Greece and Turkey were not listed as eligible countries to be invited to join NATO; and second, the relationship between these two Mediterranean countries was not in a good shape because of their friction over the island of Cyprus. Bevin believed he could not fight for Greek and Turkish NATO membership as France did with Italy. The situation regarding Greece and Turkey was far more complicated than Italy. This was fundamentally because of Cyprus.

Bevin truly believed that Greek and Turkish membership of NATO was not yet appropriate to be tabled and discussed at that time as Bevin believed this would add more delays and problems in forming NATO. If the United States kept postponing the signing of NATO, the decision to leave Greece and Turkey out of NATO was regarded by Bevin as a practical decision in dealing with the long enduring process of forming NATO. Although Greece and Turkey were important to Britain in regards to British strategic interests in both countries, and the need to prevent these countries from falling into the Soviet Union's domination was very crucial; Bevin's objective to have NATO set up was his utmost priority at the time.

## References

<sup>i</sup> See Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p. 11.

<sup>ii</sup> This interpretation was advanced in the memoirs of participants and the writings of the majority of contemporary commentators and historians until the 1960s. Prominent examples are Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume 1: Year of Decisions* (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1955); Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1956); Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970).

<sup>iii</sup> The revisionists put the blame on the United States by arguing that the failure of the United States in discovering the defensive nature of the policy of the Soviet Union in the post-war era brought on an avoidable Cold War and represented by the needless and provocative NATO military alliance. This revisionist view was propounded by contemporary dissidents such as Henry Wallace and by New Left historians of the 1960s. For examples see John M. Blum (ed.), *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-46* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Denna F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-60* (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961); Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972); Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

<sup>iv</sup> The post-revisionists placed the blame squarely and appropriately on both sides; the Soviet Union and the United States were regarded as countries that were equally responsible for the Cold War. The post-revisionist scholars included John L. Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, 7:3 (1983), 171-190 (p. 172); J. Samuel Walker, 'Historians and Cold War Origins: The New Consensus', in *American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review*, eds. by Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1981), pp. 207-236; Geoffrey Smith, 'Harry, We Hardly Know You': Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945-1954, *American Political Science Review*, 70:2 (1976), 560-582; Geir Lundestad, *America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945-1949: Expansion and Its Limitation in US Foreign Policy, 1945-1959* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); John L. Gaddis, *We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

<sup>v</sup> Historians have found British records to be an invaluable source for understanding the origins of the Cold War. These records demonstrate that the British alerted about the potential of a Soviet threat and prodded the United States to assume a bolder posture against Soviet/Communist expansionism. The British school scholars included John Kent, 'British Policy and the Origins of the Cold War', in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, eds. by Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1994), pp. 155-166; Anne Deighton, *Britain and the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); John A. Lukacs, *New History of the Cold War* (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1966); John W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949: French Foreign Policy and Post-war Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990); Victor Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947* (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1982); Elisabeth Barker, *The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-1950* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983); William C. Cromwell, 'The Marshall Plan, Britain and the Cold War', *Review of International Studies*, 8:4 (1982), 233-249; Robert Frazier, 'Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine', *Historical Journal*, 27:3 (1984), 715-727; Ritchie Owendale, *The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945-51* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1985).

<sup>vi</sup> See Kew, The National Archives [hereafter TNA], CAB 129/23, CP (48) 6, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4 January 1948; *FRUS*, 1948, Western European Unity and Defense, Vol. III (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 5, 165 and 175; TNA, FO 371/68067/AN 1276/1195/45/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 22 March 1948; TNA, FO 371/73073/Z 5640/2307/72/G, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security: 4<sup>th</sup> meeting, 'Security Relations with Other Western European Countries', 8 July 1948.

<sup>vii</sup> These countries were believed by the United States and Britain as Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe. See TNA, FO 371/73045/Z561/273/72/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 'The Western Union: Conversation with Mr Hickerson', 21 January 1948.

viii Peter G. Boyle, 'America's Hesitant Road to NATO, 1945-49', in *The Origins of NATO*, ed. by Joseph Smith (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), pp. 65-79 (p. 69).

ix Michael L. Dockrill and Michael F. Hopkins, *The Cold War 1945-91* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 37-38.

x Jonathan Knight, 'America's International Guarantees for the Straits: Prelude to the Truman Doctrine', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 13:2 (1977), 241-250 (p. 246); see also Barry Rubin, *The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1980), pp. 191-219.

xi Donald C. Watt, *Britain Looks to Germany: A Study of British Opinion and Policy towards Germany since 1945* (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965), p. 53.

xii See TNA, CAB 129/16, CP (47) 34, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'Policy towards Greece and Turkey', 25 January 1947; and see also Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, *Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1991), p. 139; Joseph C. Satterthwaite, 'The Truman Doctrine: Turkey', *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 401 (1972), 74-84 (p. 74).

xiii Dionysios Chourchoulis, 'The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilisation?' (Doctoral thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2010), p. 29. See also Melvyn F. Leffler, 'Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945-1952', *The Journal of American History*, 71:4 (1985), 807-825 (p. 811); Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (London: Aldwych Press, 1981), p. 27.

xiv See Rohan Butler, et al. (eds.), *Document on British Policy Overseas [hereafter DBPO]: Series I Volume I, The Conference at Potsdam, July-August 1945* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1984), Sir A. Clerk Kerr (Moscow) to Mr Eden, 10 July 1945, p. 146. See also John Kent, 'The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49', in *Britain and the First Cold War*, ed. by Anne Deighton (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), pp. 165-183 (p. 166).

xv Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), p. 8. In Truman's memoir, he implied that the aid to Greece and Turkey was the turning point in America's foreign policy. See Truman, *Volume II*, p. 111.

xvi Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1947* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), President's Message to Congress, 12 March 1947, p. 179; see also Lawrence S. Kaplan, 'The Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine: the Case of Greece', *Journal of the Early Republic*, 13:1 (1993), 1-21 (p. 4).

xvii Martin McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War 1941-1949: Fourth Edition* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016), p. 114; Bradley Lightbody, *The Cold War* (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1999), p. 18. See also Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), p. 21; John W. Young, *Cold War Europe 1945-1991: A Political History* (London: Arnold, 1996), p. 15.

xviii The United States believed without further prompt and substantial aid from the USA, economic, social and political disintegration will overwhelm Europe. See *FRUS*, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Vol. III, pp. 230-232.

xix TNA, FO 371/79222/Z 444/1074/72/G, Foreign Office Minute, 11 January 1949. See also Jamil Hasanli, *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013), p. 340.

xx Ekavi Athanassopoulou, 'Western Defence Developments and Turkey's Search for Security in 1948', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32:2 (1996), pp. 77-108 (103-104).

xxi TNA, FO 371/67276/R11125/68/44, Sir Noel Charles to Foreign Office, 7 August 1947; TNA, FO 371/67276/R11125/68/44, Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Rome, 12 September 1947.

xxii See TNA, FO 800/502/Part 2, Review on the situation in Turkey – B. Eastern Mediterranean Bloc, 28 July 1948. See also TNA, FO 371/78329/R2889/1072/67, Minutes by Strang, 8 March 1949.

xxiii Ibid. See also TNA, FO 371/68067/AN 1315/1195/45/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 25 March 1948.

xxiv Ibid.

xxv Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 201. See also TNA, FO 371/68067/AN 1276/1195/45/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 22 March 1948.

<sup>xxvi</sup> How Bevin supervised the negotiations through the British delegation was clearly shown in the Foreign Office record of FO 371 under class mark General. The files numbers are FO 371/73072, FO 371/73073, FO 371/73074, FO 371/73075, FO 371/73077, FO 371/73081, FO 371/79221, FO 371/79222, FO 371/79228 and FO 371/79229. These files hold the record during the Pentagon Talks, the Washington Talks and the last-minute talks in early 1949 on the point of view of the Foreign Office and its Foreign Secretary Bevin. These files depict that the British delegations always referred to Bevin for what to propose or suggest and what should they do when any disputes arose during the negotiations in creating NATO.

<sup>xxvii</sup> *FRUS*, 1948, Western European Unity and Defense, Vol. III, p. 107; TNA, FO 371/73075/Z 6948/2307/72/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 26 August 1948; TNA, FO 371/73075/Z 6948/2307/72/G, Foreign Office to Washington, 30 August 1948.

<sup>xxviii</sup> TNA, FO 371/79222/Z 444/1074/72/G, Foreign Office Minute, 11 January 1949.

<sup>xxix</sup> TNA, FO 371/79229/Z 1778/1074/72/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 26 February 1949.

<sup>xxx</sup> TNA, FO 371/79221/Z 283/1074/72/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 18 March 1949.

<sup>xxxi</sup> TNA, FO 371/78459/R3193/1072/19, Athens to Foreign Office, 21 March 1949. See also TNA, FO 800/483, Washington to Foreign Office, 16 March 1949; TNA FO 800/483/NA/49/6, Mr Bevin to Sir D. Kelly (Angora), 10 March 1949; TNA, PREM 8/1379(Part 1)/3042, Foreign Office to Washington, 17 March 1949. TNA, FO 800/448, Record of Meeting Held 27<sup>th</sup> January at 10:30 A.M. (Restricted Session), p. 14 and p. 15.

<sup>xxxii</sup> See TNA, CAB 129/23, CP (48) 6, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4 January 1948; TNA, FO 371/73045/Z 273/273/72/G, Foreign Office to Washington, 13 January 1948. After the Second World War ended, Britain who had been weakened by its economic difficulties could no longer stand alone before the Soviet Union without any help from the other Great Powers especially the United States. Bevin and the Foreign Office, therefore, intended to rely on the United States' economic assistance via the ERP, but the Soviet Union's hostility towards ERP left Bevin with little choice but to form a new security alliance without the participation of the Soviet Union as soon as possible. In fact, at that time the UN already existed to tighten security in international affairs. However, the UN was not seen by Bevin as one effective collective security body because the Soviet Union was abusing its veto repeatedly within the Security Council [The Soviet Union proposed 105 vetoes between 1946 and 1969. See Joseph Smith, *The Cold War 1945-1991* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), p. 78]. Bevin undoubtedly believed a new security organisation without Soviet Union's participation needed to be established. NATO was expected to function more efficiently than the UN at preserving stability and security in the European continent. More importantly, NATO could effectively halt the expansion of Soviet Union's power and Communist ideology from spreading around the world.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Between 1955 and 1959, the Cyprus dispute was in a full-scale war of Cyprus Emergency. Thus, explains why scholars tend to study about the Cyprus dispute during this period rather than the early period of the Cyprus dispute between 1945 and 1951.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots look to Greece and Turkey respectively as their protector. George H. Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955* (London: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 110. See also Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), p. 45.

<sup>xxxv</sup> After the Second World War had ended in the year 1945, Greek Cypriots continued their mission for self-determination and *enosis* that had stopped for a while because of the war. This was primarily because the island of Cyprus was one of the battlefields of the Second World War. Started in the year 1945 onwards, the *enosis* campaign was immersed by the renewal of valuable support from the Greek government. See Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-59* (United States of America: University of Minnesota, 1997), p. 6.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> In November, a Turkish Cypriot delegation visited President Inonu, and he was reported to have reassured them that Turkey was concerned about the future of Cyprus. Clearly, the Turkish government made a promise that it would help Turkish Cypriots resist *enosis*. See Crawshaw, p. 45.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> TNA, FO 800/454, Oliver Franks to Bevin, 29 December 1948.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> TNA, CAB 129/23, CP (48) 6, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4 January 1948; *FRUS*, 1948, Western European Unity and Defense, Vol. III (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 5, 165 and 175; TNA, FO 371/68067/AN 1276/1195/45/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 22 March 1948; TNA, FO 371/68067/AN 1315/1195/45/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 25 March 1948; TNA, FO 371/73073/Z

---

5640/2307/72/G, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security: 4<sup>th</sup> meeting, 'Security Relations with Other Western European Countries', 8 July 1948. See also Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, pp. 193-212.

<sup>xxxix</sup> TNA, FO 371/79221/Z283/1074/72/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 'North Atlantic Pact: Meeting of Washington Working Party on January 10', 10 January 1949. See also John Baylis, *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-1949* (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1993), p. 112.

<sup>xl</sup> The files that hold the record during the last-minutes talk in early 1949 are FO 371/73081, FO 371/79221, FO 371/79222, FO 371/79228 and FO 371/79229. These files depict that the delegates that involved in the negotiations to form NATO were experiencing bitter debates regarding Italian and Algerian membership. Also this matter caused the delay in the signing ceremony of the treaty of NATO.

<sup>xli</sup> TNA, FO 800/448, Record of Meeting on Thursday, 27<sup>th</sup> January, 1949, at 10:30 A.M. (Full Session), p. 8.

<sup>xlii</sup> *FRUS*, 1948, Western European Unity and Defense, Vol. III, p. 179. TNA, FO 371/79221/Z283/1074/72/G, Washington to Foreign Office, 'North Atlantic Pact: Meeting of Washington Working Party on January 10', 10 January 1949; TNA, FO 371/79222/Z 444/1074/72/G, Foreign Office Minute, 11 January 1949.

<sup>xliii</sup> TNA, FO 800/454, Secretary of State's File, 31 December 1948; TNA, PREM 8/1379(Part 1)/PM/48/122, Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister, 1 January 1949.